A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks that face uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. This paper examines the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds and the optimal policy of a central bank in response to liquidity shocks. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held by different banks, a central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that the traditional separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be rethought. In addition, we show that, during an aggregate liquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Therefore, two different instrumentsinterest rates and liquidity injection-are required to cope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the probability of bank runs.
Introduction
The appropriate response of a central bank's interest rate policy to banking crises is the subject of a continuing and important debate. A standard view is that monetary policy should play a role only if a …nancial disruption directly a¤ects in ‡ation or the real economy; that is, monetary policy should not be used to alleviate …nancial distress per se. Additionally, several studies on interlinkages between monetary policy and …nancial-stability policy recommend the complete separation of the two, citing evidence of higher and more volatile in ‡ation rates in countries where the central bank is in charge of banking stability. 1 This view of monetary policy is challenged by observations that, during a banking crisis, interbank interest rates often appear to be a key instrument used by central banks for limiting threats to the banking system and interbank markets. During the recent crisis, which began in August 2007, interest rate setting in both the U.S. and the E.U. appeared to be geared heavily toward alleviating stress in the banking system and in the interbank market in particular. Interest rate policy has been used similarly in previous …nancial disruptions, as Goodfriend (2002) indicates: "Consider the fact that the Fed cut interest rates sharply in response to two of the most serious …nancial crises in recent years: the October 1987 stock market break and the turmoil following the Russian default in 1998."
The practice of reducing interbank rates during …nancial turmoil also challenges the longdebated view originated by Bagehot (1873) that central banks should provide liquidity to banks at high-penalty interest rates (see Martin 2009 , for example).
We develop a model of the interbank market and show that the central bank's interest rate policy can directly improve liquidity conditions in the interbank lending market during a …nancial crisis. Consistent with central bank practice, the optimal policy in our model consists of reducing the interbank rate during a crisis. This view implies that the conventionally supported separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned during a systemic crisis.
Intuition for our results can be gained by understanding the role of the interbank market. The main purpose of this market is to redistribute the …xed amount of reserves that is held within the banking system. In our model, banks may face uncertainty regarding 1 See Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1995) and Di Giorgio and Di Noia (1999) . their need for liquid assets, which we associate with reserves. The interbank market allows banks faced with distributional shocks to redistribute liquid assets among themselves. The interest rate will therefore play a key role in amplifying or reducing the losses of banks enduring liquidity shocks. Consequently, it will also in ‡uence the banks' precautionary holding of liquid securities. High interest rates in the interbank market during a liquidity crisis would partially inhibit the liquidity insurance role of banks, while low interest rates will decrease uncertainty and increase the e¢ ciency of banks'contingent allocation of resources. Yet in order to make low interest rates during a crisis compatible with the higher return on banks'long-term assets, during normal times interbank interest rates must be higher than the return on long-term assets.
We allow for di¤erent states regarding the uncertainty faced by banks. We associate a state of high uncertainty with a crisis and a state of low uncertainty with normal times.
We also permit the interbank market rate to be state dependent. A new result of our model is that there are multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria associated with di¤erent pairs of interbank market rates for normal and crisis times. The multiplicity of equilibria arises because the demand for and supply of funds in the interbank market are inelastic. This inelasticity is a key feature of our model and corresponds to the fundamentally inelastic nature of banks'short-term liquidity needs. By choosing the interbank rate appropriately, high in normal times and low in crisis times, a central bank can achieve the optimal allocation.
The interbank rate plays two roles in our model. From an ex-ante perspective, the expected rate in ‡uences the banks'portfolio decision for holding short-term liquid assets and long-term illiquid assets. Ex post, the rate determines the terms at which banks can borrow liquid assets in response to idiosyncratic shocks, so that a trade-o¤ is present between the two roles. The optimal allocation can be achieved only with state-contingent interbank rates. The rate must be low in crisis times to achieve the e¢ cient redistribution of liquid assets. Since the ex-ante expected rate must be high, to induce the optimal investment choice by banks, the interbank rate needs to be set high enough in normal times. As the conventional separation of prudential regulation and monetary policy implies that interest rates are set independently of prudential considerations, our result is a strong criticism of such separation.
Our framework yields several additional results. First, when aggregate liquidity shocks are considered, we show that the central banks should accommodate the shocks by injecting or withdrawing liquidity. Interest rates and liquidity injections should be used to address two di¤erent types of liquidity shocks: Interest rate management allows for coping with e¢ cient liquidity reallocation in the interbank market, while quantitative easing allows for tackling aggregate liquidity shocks. Hence, when interbank markets are modeled as part of an optimal institutional arrangement, the central bank should respond to di¤erent types of shocks with di¤erent tools. Second, we show that the failure to implement a contingent interest rate policy, which will occur if the separation between monetary policy and prudential regulation prevails, will undermine …nancial stability by increasing the probability of bank runs.
In their seminal study, Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) examine banks with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks from a mechanism design perspective. In their model, when liquidity shocks are not observable, the interbank market is not e¢ cient and the second-best allocation involves setting a limit on the size of individual loan contracts among banks. Both our paper and that of Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2008) develop frameworks in which interbank markets are e¢ cient. In Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2008), the central bank responds to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks by buying and selling assets, using its balance sheet to achieve the e¢ cient allocation. The modeling innovation of our paper is to introduce multiple states with di¤erent distributional liquidity shocks. With state-contingent interbank rates, the full-information e¢ cient allocation can be achieved. Goodfriend and King (1988) argue that central bank policy should respond to aggregate, but not idiosyncratic, liquidity shocks when interbank markets are e¢ cient. In our model, their result does not hold, even though bank returns are known and speculative bank runs are ruled out. The reason is that the level of interest rates determines the banks' cost of being short of liquidity and, therefore, penalizes the long-term claim holders who have to bear this liquidity-related risk. The results of our paper are similar to those of Diamond and Rajan (2008) , who show that interbank rates should be low during a crisis and high in normal times. Diamond and Rajan (2008) examine the limits of central bank in ‡uence over bank interest rates based on a Ricardian equivalence argument, whereas we …nd a new mechanism by which the central bank can adjust interest rates based on the inelasticity of banks'short-term supply of and demand for liquidity. Our paper also relates 
Model
The model has three dates, denoted by t = 0; 1; 2, and a continuum of competitive banks, each with a unit continuum of consumers. Ex-ante identical consumers are endowed with one unit of good at date 0 and learn their private type at date 1. With a probability 2 (0; 1); a consumer is "impatient" and needs to consume at date 1. With complementary probability 1 ; a consumer is "patient" and needs to consume at date 2. Throughout the paper, we disregard sunspot-triggered bank runs. At date 0, consumers deposit their unit good in their bank for a deposit contract that pays an amount when withdrawn at either date 1 or 2. were ‡eeing AAA-rated securities, commercial paper, and money market funds in a ‡ight to quality and liquidity.
We model distributional liquidity shocks within the banking system by assuming that each bank faces stochastic idiosyncratic withdrawals at date 1. There is no aggregate withdrawal risk for the banking system as a whole so. On average, each bank has withdrawals at date 1. 3 The innovation that distinguishes our model from that of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) In aggregate, half of banks are type h and half are type l. Banks of type j 2 J have a fraction of impatient depositors at date 1 equal to
where i 2 I and " > 0 is the size of the bank-speci…c liquidity withdrawal shock. We assume that 0 < il ih < 1 for i 2 I.
To summarize, when state i = 1; a crisis occurs. Banks of type j = h have relatively high liquidity withdrawals at date 1 and banks of type j = l have relatively low liquidity 3 We study a model with distributional and aggregate shocks in Section 4. ; an equal share of the remaining goods at the depositor's bank j, for withdrawal at date 2. Depositor utility is
where u is increasing and concave. We de…ne c 0 2 c 0j 2 for all j 2 J , since consumption for impatient depositors of each bank type is equal during normal-times state i = 0: A depositor's expected utility is The bank budget constraints for bank j for dates 1 and 2 are
respectively, where ij 2 [0; 1 ] is the amount of liquid assets that banks of type j store between dates 1 and 2. We assume that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion for u(c) is greater than one, which implies that banks provide risk-decreasing liquidity insurance. We also assume that banks lend liquid assets when indi¤erent between lending and storing. We only consider parameters such that there are no bank defaults in equilibrium. 4 As such, we assume that incentive compatibility holds:
for all i 2 I; j 2 J ; which rules out bank runs based on very large bank liquidity shocks.
The bank optimizes over ; c 1 ; fc ij 2 ; ij ; f ij g i2I; j2J to maximize its depositors' expected utility. From the date 1 budget constraint (3), we can solve for the quantity of interbank borrowing by bank j as
Substituting this expression for f ij into the date 2 budget constraint (4) and rearranging gives consumption by impatient depositors as
The bank's optimization can be written as
s.t.
4 Bank defaults and insolvencies that cause bank runs are considered in Section 5.
where constraint (8) gives the maximum amount of liquid assets that can be stored between dates 1 and 2.
The clearing condition for the interbank market is
An equilibrium consists of contingent interbank market interest rates and an allocation such that banks maximize pro…ts, consumers make their withdrawal decisions to maximize their expected utility, and the interbank market clears.
Results and interest rate policy
In this section, we derive the optimal allocation and characterize equilibrium allocations.
We start by showing that the optimal allocation is independent of the liquidity-shock state i 2 I and bank types j 2 J . Next, we derive the Euler and no-arbitrage conditions. After that, we study the special cases in which a "crisis never occurs"when = 0 and in which a "crisis always occurs"when = 1. This allows us to build intuition for the general case where 2 [0; 1]:
First best allocation
To …nd the full-information …rst best allocation, we consider a planner who can observe consumer types. The planner can ignore the liquidity-shock state i, bank type j; and bank liquidity withdrawal shocks ij : The planner maximizes the expected utility of depositors subject to feasibility constraints:
The constraints are the physical quantities of goods available for consumption at date 1 and 2, and available storage between dates 1 and 2, respectively. The …rst-order conditions and binding constraints give the well-known …rst best allocations, denoted with asterisks, as implicitly de…ned by
Equation (11) shows that the ratio of marginal utilities between dates 1 and 2 is equal to the marginal return on investment r:
First-order conditions
Next, we consider the optimization problem of a bank of type j given by equations (7) - (9) in order to …nd the Euler and no-arbitrage pricing equations.
Lemma 1. First-order conditions with respect to c 1 and are, respectively,
Proof. The Lagrange multiplier for constraint (8) is ij : The …rst-order condition with respect to ij is
We …rst will show that ij = 0 for all i 2 I; j 2 J . Suppose not, that
This implies that equation (17) or (18) Therefore, ij = 0 for all i 2 I; j 2 J can be substituted into the binding …rst order conditions (17) and (18), which can be written in expectation form to give equations (15) and (16) .
Equation (15) is the Euler equation and determines the investment level given i for i 2 I: Equation (16), which corresponds to the …rst-order condition with respect to ; is the no-arbitrage pricing condition for the rate i , which states that the expected marginal utility-weighted returns on storage and investment must be equal at date t = 0. The return on investment is r: The return on storage is the rate i at which liquid assets can be lent at date 1, since banks can store liquid assets at date 0, lend them at date 1, and will receive i at date 2. At the interest rates 1 and 0 ; banks are indi¤erent to holding liquid assets and long-term assets at date 0 according to the no-arbitrage condition. A corollary result shown in the proof of Lemma 1 is that banks do not store liquid assets at date 1:
All liquid goods at date 1 are distributed by the banking system to impatient depositors.
The interbank market-clearing condition (10), together with the interbank market demand equation (5), determines c j 1 ( ) and f ij ( ) as functions of :
Since no liquid assets are stored between dates 1 and 2 for state i = 0; 1, patient depositors' consumption c 0 2 in state i = 0 equals the average of patient depositors' consumption c ij 2
in state i = 1 and equals total investment returns r divided by the mass of impatient depositors 1 :
3.3 Single liquidity-shock state: 2 f0; 1g
We start by …nding solutions to the special cases of 2 f0; 1g in which there is certainty about the single state of the world i at date 1. These are particularly interesting benchmarks. In the case of = 0; the state i = 0 is always realized. This case corresponds to the standard framework of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and can be interpreted as a crisis never occurring. In the case of = 1; the state i = 1 is always realized. This corresponds to the case studied by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and can be interpreted as a crisis always occurring. These boundary cases will then help to solve the general model
With only a single possible state of the world at date 1, it is easy to show that the interbank rate must equal the return on long-term assets. First-order conditions (15) and (16) can be written more explicitly as
As is intuitive, for = 0; the value of 1 is indeterminate, and for = 1; the value of 0 is indeterminate. In either case, there is an equilibrium with a unique allocation c 1 ; c ij 2 ; and . The indeterminate variable is of no consequence for the allocation. The allocation is determined by the two …rst-order equations, in the two unknowns and 0 (for = 0) or
. Equation (23) shows that the interbank lending rate equals the return on long-term assets: 0 = r (for = 0) or 1 = r (for = 1): With a single state of the world, the interbank lending rate must equal the return on long-term assets. For = 0; the crisis state never occurs. There is no need for banks to borrow on the interbank market. The banks'budget constraints imply that in equilibrium no interbank lending occurs, f 0j = 0 for j 2 J . However, the interbank lending rate 0 still plays the role of clearing markets: It is the lending rate at which each bank's excess demand is zero, which requires that the returns on liquidity and investment are equal. The result is 0 = r; which is an important market price that ensures banks hold optimal liquidity. Our result-that the banks'portfolio decision is a¤ected by a market price at which there is no trading-is similar to the e¤ect of prices with no trading in equilibrium in standard portfolio theory and asset pricing with a representative agent. The Euler equation (24) is equivalent to equation (11) for the planner. Banks choose the optimal and provide the …rst best allocation c 1 and c 2 :
Proposition 1. For = 0; the equilibrium is characterized by 0 = r and has a unique …rst best allocation c 1 ; c 2 , :
Proof. For = 0; equation (23) ; which is less than the interbank market intertemporal rate 0 ; since
This contract is optimal because the ratio of intertemporal marginal utility equals the marginal return on long-term assets,
We now turn to the symmetric case of = 1; where the crisis state i = 1 always occurs. We show that, in this case, the optimal allocation cannot be obtained, even though interbank lending provides redistribution of liquidity. Nevertheless, because the interbank rate is high, 1 = r, patient depositors face ine¢ cient consumption risk, and the liquidity provided to impatient depositors is reduced. The banks'borrowing demand from equation (21) shows that f 1h = "c 1 and f 1l = "c 1 .
First, consider the outcome at date 1 holding …xed = . With 1 = r; patient depositors do not have optimal consumption since c 1h 2 ( ) < c 2 < c 1l 2 ( ): A bank of type h has to borrow at date 1 at the rate 1 = r; higher than the optimal rate of 
> :
Proof. For = 1; equation (23) implies 1 = r: By equation (6), c 1l 2 > c 1h 2 : From the bank's budget constraints and market clearing,
which implies
and c 1h 2 < c 1l 2 : Thus,
Since u 0 (c 1 ( )) is increasing in and u 0 (c and c 1h 2 < c 2 : Notice that, for = 1, the di¤erence between our approach and that of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) is that in our framework the market cannot impose any restriction on the size of the trades. This forces the interbank market to equal r and creates an ine¢ ciency.
The mechanism design approach of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) yields a second best allocation that achieves higher welfare, but in that case the market cannot be anonymous anymore, as the size of the trade has to be observed and enforced.
Multiple liquidity-shock states: 2 [0; 1]
We now apply our results for the special cases 2 f0; 1g to the general case 2 [0; 1]: It is convenient to de…ne an ex-post equilibrium, which refers to the interest rate that clears the interbank market in state i at date 1, conditional on a given and c 1 : For distinction, we use the term ex-ante equilibrium to refer to our equilibrium concept used above from the perspective of date 0. We …rst show that the supply and demand in the interbank market are inelastic, which creates an indeterminacy of the ex-post equilibrium interest rate. Next, we show that there is a real indeterminacy of the ex-ante equilibrium. There is a continuum of Pareto-ranked ex-ante equilibria with di¤erent values for c 1 ; c ij 2 ; and . We …rst show the indeterminacy of the ex-post equilibrium interest rate. In state i = 1; bank type l has excess liquid assets that it supplies in the interbank market of
The liquid bank has an inelastic supply of liquid assets above a rate of one because its alternative to lending is storage, which gives a return of one. Bank type h has a demand for liquid assets of
The maximum rate 1 at which the illiquid bank type j can borrow, such that the incentive constraint c 1h 2 c 1 holds and patient depositors do not withdraw at date 1, is
The illiquid bank has an inelastic demand for liquid assets below the rate 1 because its alternative to borrowing is to default on withdrawals to impatient depositors at date 1. The banks'supply and demand curves for date 1 are illustrated in Figure 3 . In state i = 0; each bank has an inelastic net demand for liquid assets of
At a rate of 0 > 1; banks do not have any liquid assets they can lend in the market.
All such assets are needed to cover the withdrawals of impatient depositors. At a rate of 0 < 1, a bank could store any amount of liquid assets borrowed for a return of one. Proof. Substituting for f 0j ( 0 ) from (27), for j 2 J , into market-clearing condition (10) and solving gives the condition for the equilibrium rate 0 : Substituting for f 1l ( 1 ) and (25) and (26) into market-clearing condition (10) and solving gives the corresponding condition for the equilibrium rate 1 :
This result highlights a key insight of our model: The supply and demand of short-term liquidity are fundamentally inelastic. By the nature of short-term …nancing, distributional liquidity shocks imply that liquidity held in excess of immediate needs is of low fundamental value to the bank that holds it, while demand for liquidity for immediate needs is of high fundamental value to the bank that requires it to prevent default. The interest rate i determines how gains from trade are shared ex-post among banks. Low rates bene…t illiquid banks and their claimants, and decrease impatient depositors'consumption risk, which increases ex-ante expected utility for all depositors.
Next, we show that there exists a continuum of Pareto-ranked ex-ante equilibria. Finding an equilibrium amounts to solving the two …rst-order conditions, equations (15) there exists a continuum of ex-ante equilibria. 5 Allen and Gale (2004) also show that a continuum of interbank rates can support an ex-post sunspot equilibrium. However, because they consider a model with a single state, the only rate that supports an ex-ante equilibrium is r, similar to our benchmark case of = 1.
If the interbank rate is not state contingent, 1 = 0 = r is the unique equilibrium, as is clear from equation (23) . The allocation resembles a weighted average of the cases With interbank rates equal to r in all states, patient depositors face too much risk. To compensate them for this risk, their expected consumption must be increased to the detriment of impatient depositors. Finally, we show that there exists a …rst best ex-ante equilibrium with state contingent interest rates for < 1: The interest rate must equal the optimal return on bank deposits during a crisis:
To show this, …rst we substitute for 1 ; ij ; c 1 ; and ij from equations (28), (1), (20) , and (19) into equation (6) and simplify, which for i = 1 and j = h; l gives
This shows that, with 1 equal to the optimal intertemporal return on deposits between dates 1 and 2, there is optimal risk-sharing of the goods that are available at date 2. This implies that the interbank market rate has to be low for patient depositors to face no risk. Substituting for 1 ; c 1j 2 ; and c 0 2 from equations (28), (29), and (22), respectively, into equation (23) and rearranging gives the interest rate in state i = 0:
and further substituting for these variables into equation (24) 
The market rate 0 must be greater than r during the no-shock state, in order for the expected rate to equal r; such that banks are indi¤erent to holding liquid assets and investing at date 0. Equation (16) implies, then, that the expected market rate is E[ i ] = r: Figure 5 illustrates the di¤erence between the …rst best equilibrium (with 1 ; 0 ) and the suboptimal equilibrium (with 1 = 0 = r): Arrows indicate the change in consumption between the suboptimal and the …rst best equilibria. 
Central bank interest rate policy
The result of multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria and a need for a state-contingent interest rate in our model suggest a role for an institution that can select the best equilibrium. Since equilibria can be distinguished by the interest rate in the interbank market, a central bank is the natural candidate for this role. A central bank can select the optimal equilibrium and intervene by targeting the optimal market interest rate. We think of the interest rate i at which banks lend in the interbank market as the unsecured interest rate that many central banks target for monetary policy. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve targets the overnight interest rate, also known as the federal funds rate.
We extend the model by adding a central bank that can o¤er to borrow an amount > 0 below i and lend an amount > 0 above i on the interbank market in order to target the interbank rate equal to i . The central bank's objective is to maximize the depositor's expected utility equation (2), subject to the bank's optimization equations (7) through (9), by submitting the following demand and supply functions, respectively, for the interbank market:
for any > 0: The goods-clearing condition for the interbank market (10) is replaced by
Substituting for the supply and demand functions, the market-clearing condition (34) can be written as
which, for any > 0; holds for the unique state i ex-post equilibrium rate i = i , for i 2 I. The ex-post equilibrium rate in state i = 1 is shown in Figure 6 . The …gure illustrates how the central bank shifts the market supply and demand curves such that there is a unique equilibrium at 1 : At i ; the equilibrium quantity that clears the market according to condition (34) is i"c 1 : The quantity ; with which the central bank intervenes out of equilibrium, is irrelevant. The state-conditional equilibrium rate is uniquely determined as i and the ex-ante equilibrium is uniquely determined as ( ; 0 , 1 ), for any > 0. We extend the model to allow the probability of a depositor being impatient-and, hence, the aggregate fraction of impatient depositors in the economy-to be stochastic. This probability is denoted by a ; where a 2 A fH; Lg is the aggregate-shock state, The aggregate-state random variable a is independent of the idiosyncratic-state variable i:
We assume that the central bank can tax the endowment of agents at date 0, store these goods, and return the taxes at date 1 or at date 2. We denote these transfers, which can be conditional on the aggregate shock, 0 , 1a , 2a , a 2 A, respectively.
The depositor's expected utility (2) is replaced by
and the bank's budget constraints (3) and (4) With interbank market rates set in that way, banks will choose the optimal investment. Indeed, since equation (36) holds, banks are willing to invest in both storage and the longterm technology. In states where there is no idiosyncratic shock, there is no interbank market lending, so any deviation from the optimal investment carries a cost. In states where there is an idiosyncratic shock, the rate on the interbank market is such that the expected utility of a bank's depositors cannot be higher than under the …rst best allocation, so there is no bene…t from deviating from the optimal investment in these states. 
Contingent interest rate setting and …nancial stability
Our model allows us to shed light on the role of the interbank market in coping with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and the impact of interest rates on the ex-post redistribution of risks. In our framework, a contingent interest-rate-setting policy dominates a noncontingent one. This is a strong criticism of the conventional view supporting the separation of prudential regulation and monetary policy. We now proceed to compare contingent and noncontingent interest rate policy in terms of …nancial stability. We show that fundamental bank runs can occur for a noncontingent interest-rate-setting policy, whereas they cannot arise when a contingent interest rate setting is implemented. Thus, contingent interest-rate-setting policy, and the rejection of separation between prudential and monetary policies, fares better also in terms of …nancial stability.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock is zero, such that the fraction of impatient depositors is always ; as in the basic idiosyncratic-shock-state model of Section 3. We now consider a wider range of parameters.
We no longer require that c : If " is large, it may be the case that the consumption of patient depositors of banks with many impatient agents would be lower if they withdraw at date 2 than if they withdraw at date 1, which would trigger a bank run. Obviously, if the optimal contingent interest-rate-setting policy is applied, and i 1 = (17) and (18), do not bind, implying ij = 0 for i 2 I; j 2 J : As converges to 0; by continuity, equilibrium allocations converge to
with c 1 = so that " has to satisfy
r 1 :
2 ; then this condition becomes " 1 : The condition on parameters such that c ij 2 > 0 requires " < c 1 ; which is su¢ cient to ensure " 1 since = 1 c 1 and c 1 > 1: So, bank runs will occur for " 2 ( ; c 1 ); which is a non-empty interval. Thus, there exist " for which bank runs will occur. Now, since bank runs are anticipated, banks could choose a "run preventing"deposit contract, as suggested by Cooper and Ross (1998) . However, following the argument in that paper, banks will not choose a run-preventing deposit contract if the probability of a bank run is su¢ ciently small. So for su¢ ciently close to zero, there exist " for which bank runs will occur in equilibrium.
Liquidation of the long-term technology
We endogenize the amount of liquid assets available in the interbank market at date 1 by extending the model to allow for premature liquidation of the investment. Allowing for liquidation also allows us to examine the robustness of the central bank's interest rate policy to banks'outside options for borrowing on the interbank market. Banks in need of liquidity may choose to liquidate investment if the interbank rate is too high. This can restrict the set of feasible real interbank rates and may preclude the …rst best equilibrium.
Indeed, as banks have the alternative option of liquidating their assets, interbank market rates that are larger than the return on liquidation are not feasible, and this might restrict the central bank's policy options.
Again, to simplify the exposition, we assume that the fraction of impatient depositors is always . At date 1, bank j can liquidate ij of the investment for a salvage rate of return s at date 1 and no further return at date 2. The bank budget constraints (3) and (4) are replaced by
respectively, and the bank optimization (7) is replaced by
s.t. The ability for banks to liquidate long-term assets for liquid assets and lend them on the interbank market restricts the ex-post equilibrium interest rate from being too high. This is the case because, for any state i; the ex-post equilibrium rate is restricted by i Proof. If 0 > r s ; then the equilibrium rate is 0 < r s < 0 ; it is less than the equilibrium rate required to support a …rst best equilibrium.
If the probability of a crisis is low enough, then the …rst best equilibrium is always feasible. The limit of 0 as ! 0 is r: Moreover, for small ; 0 has to be only slightly greater than r for the interest rate in expectation to equal r; because the probability of the rate being low during a crisis is small. This result is expressed in the next proposition. It is interesting to emphasize that, as s stands for salvage value of the investment, it can be interpreted as the liquidity of a market for the long-run technology. From that perspective, our result states that the higher the liquidity of the market for the long-term technology, the lower the ex-ante e¢ ciency of the banking system. Our result is surprising in the context of central bank policy, but it is quite natural in the context of DiamondDybvig models, where the trading of deposits destroys the liquidity insurance function of banks.
Conclusion
Our paper provides micro-foundations for the interbank market role in allocating liquidity, which is important in order to understand how central banks should respond to liquidity shocks. Two types of liquidity shocks are considered: distributional shocks and aggregate shocks. The main insight is that, because of the inelasticity of the short-term market for the liquid asset, the central bank can pick an optimal equilibrium from a set of equilibria by setting the interest rate in the interbank market appropriately. Faced with a distributional shock, the central bank should lower the interbank rate to facilitate the reallocation of liquid assets between banks. However, in order to provide incentives for banks to hold enough liquid assets ex ante, the central bank must make sure that interbank rates are high enough when the distributional shock does not occur.
On the other hand, the central bank should respond to aggregate shocks with a quantitative policy of injecting liquid assets in the economy. The goal of this policy is twofold.
First, it helps achieve the optimal distribution of consumption between patient and impatient depositors. Second, it sets the amount of liquid assets in the interbank market at the level at which the central bank's interest rate policy can be e¤ective. Hence, the quantitative policy required in the face of aggregate shocks complements the interest rate policy that is optimal in the face of distributional shocks.
Our model also shows that a failure to implement the optimal interest rate policy can lead to bank runs. When the interbank market rate is not set appropriately, a distributional shock creates consumption risk for patient depositors. If the rate is high, banks that need to borrow in the interbank market will be left with few goods for their patient depositors. For some parameter values, and if the rate is high enough, the goods available to patient depositors will yield less consumption than the amount promised to impatient depositors. This will create a run as all patient depositors will have an incentive to claim to be impatient.
While our model does not consider risky long-term assets, and thus, prevents us from studying issues related to counterparty risk, it provides valuable insights into the optimal policy of central banks during the …rst part of the crisis, which occurred from mid-2007 to mid-2008. During that period, distributional shocks to the interbank market were important. The policies adopted by central banks in this instance resemble the ones our model suggests are optimal.
Appendix A: Generalization to N states
Consider a generalization of the baseline model (without runs or liquidation of long-term assets) with N idiosyncratic states i 1 ; :::; i N 0. We assume i 1 = 0; inH = + i n "; and inL = i n "; where i n 2 fi 1 ; :::; i N g. The probability of i n is n , P N n=1 n = 1. A bank's problem is thus
for i n 2 fi 1 ; :::; i N g; j 2 J :
The …rst-order conditions with respect to and c 1 are, respectively,
By the same logic as in the case with two states, the interest rate in the interbank market should be equal to for all n 2. Let = P N n=2 i n , and then we can write interest rate i 1 as
which is equal to 0 = 0 in the two-state baseline model. 7 7 We can show that if there is no state with a zero-size shock, then a …rst best equilibrium does not exist because an equilibrium requires an interest rate of
for at least one idiosyncratic state i; which is then always distortionary. If the baseline model is modi…ed such that with two idiosyncratic states 0 < i0 < i1; we can show that there is a constrained-e¢ cient equilbrium with
which is chosen by the central bank.
Appendix B: Monetary policy with nominal rates
We expand the real model to allow for nominal interbank lending rates. With nominal …at interest rates, the central bank can explicitly enforce its target for the interbank rate, in order to actively select the rational expectations equilibrium. The central bank o¤ers to borrow and lend to banks any amount of nominal, …at money at the central bank's policy rate at date 1, which ensures that the interbank market rate equals the central bank's policy rate. The equilibrium and allocation of the nominal rate model is equivalent to the real rate model.
Nominal rate model extension
The extension of the model to include nominal rates is based on Skeie (2008) . The bank's budget constraints from the real model (3) and (4) are replaced by budget constraints for nominal payments:
respectively, where bank j's demand to borrow from other banks is M Consumers buy goods from …rms at date t = 1; 2 in a Walrasian market using inside money as numeraire. Consumption for early and late consumers is
where P i t is the nominal price of goods at date t = 1; 2 and P (P 1 ; P i 2 ) is a vector. We consider only P i t 2 (0; 1); which is for simplicity and does not e¤ect the results. Consumers'aggregate demand is given by
The representative …rm submits a supply schedule q iS t (P i t ) for the goods market. The …rm's optimization is to maximize pro…ts:
The objective function (45a) is the pro…t in goods that the …rm consumes at date 2.
Constraints (45b) and (45c) are the maximum amounts of goods that can be sold at dates 1 and 2, respectively. Constraints (45d) and (45e) are the …rm's budget constraints to repay its loan at date 1 and date 2; respectively.
The bank's demand for borrowing on the interbank market can be solved for from equation (39) as
Substituting for M ijD f from equation (46) into equation (40) and rearranging, we …nd that bank j pays withdrawals to late consumers the amount
The bank's optimization problem (7) is replaced by 
where c 1 (P ) and c ij 2 (P ) are given by (41) and (42), respectively. An equilibrium is de…ned as goods market prices and quantities (P; q 1 ; q 2 ), deposit and loan returns and quantities fC 1 ; R i f ; M 
where f ; C 1 ; M ij o g i;j is a solution to bank j's optimization (48); fq D t (P )g t=1;2 is given by the consumers'aggregate demand (43) and (44), and (q iS 1 (P ); q iS 2 (P )) is a solution to the …rm's optimization (45).
Nominal rate results
The results of the nominal model are equivalent to those of the real model, with the addition that the central bank can choose its policy rate to target the interbank rate. The …rst order conditions for bank j's optimization (48) with respect to ; c 1 and M 
respectively. Loan returns are set according to a competitive loan market as
such that the real returns 
Condition (53) states that because of arbitrage, the interbank rate R i f equals the central bank's policy rate R i o : The real interbank rate equals the nominal rate divided by nominal goods price in ‡ation between dates 1 and 2:
which implies that the …rst order conditions for the nominal model, equations (56) and (57), and for the real model, equations (23) and (24) Proof. Equilibrium prices and quantities satisfy
The constraints in the …rm's optimization (45) bind, which gives
Substitution for quantities and prices from (60) -(63) into (41) and (42),
To …nd C 1 ; substituting for M ijD f from (46) into the market clearing condition (50) and simplifying gives
Substituting from (66) for C 1 into (46) and simplifying gives the demand for interbank borrowing by bank j as
Rearranging, aggregate bank borrowing is
Using (67), we can show that 
